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IS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION GUARANTEED BY THE
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT?*
P . W. HOGGt
Toronto
1 . The Judicature Sections of the British North America Act .
Section 96 of the British North America Act' provides that "the
Governor General shall appoint the judges of the superior, district
and county courts in each province" . Sections 97 and 98 provide
that the judges of the courts in each province shall be selected
from the bar of the province . Section 99 guarantees the tenure of
the judges of "the superior courts" until a retirement age of
seventy-five . Section 100 provides that the salaries of the judges
of "the superior, district and county courts" shall be "fixed and
provided by the Parliament of Canada". Section 101 gives to the
federal Parliament the legislative power to establish federal courts .
It is strange to find in a federal constitution that the federal
government is charged with appointing the judges of the provinces'
higher courts . The theory at the time of confederation appears to
have been that federal appointment would reinforce judicial
independence by insulating the judges from local pressures . The
Privy Council later wholeheartedly accepted this theory, describing
section 96 as one of the "principal pillars in the temple of justice",2
and as "at the root of the means adopted by the framers of the
[B.N.A. Act] to secure the impartiality and independence of the
Provincial judiciary" . ,'
It would be very difficult to document this theory that judicial
independence is better served by federal appointments than it
would be served by provincial appointments . But Canadians have
This article is based on a paper delivered at the annual conference
of the Canadian Association of Law Teachers held at Laval University,
Quebec, from May 30th to June 2nd, 1976 .
t P, W . Hogg, of the Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .
1 1867, 30 & 31 Vic ., c . 3 (U.K.), hereinafter cited as B.N.A . Act.
2 Toronto v. York, [1938] A.C . 415, at p. 426 .
3 Martineau & Sons Ltd v. Montreal, [1932] A.C . 113, at p . 120.
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Judicial Review of Administrative Action 717
become accustomed to section 96; there has been very little
criticism of it, and no move by the provinces to secure its repeal .
In any event section 96 and its associated provisions are part of
the B.N.A. Act, and the courts can hardly be blamed for enforcing
them. The doctrine which the courts have developed is that a
province is not permitted to evade section 96 by investing a
tribunal with jurisdiction of a kind which ought properly to be
exercised by a superior, district or county court, and by calling
that body an inferior court or an administrative tribunal. When
this occurs, the courts have held that the tribunal, whatever its
official name, is for constitutional purposes a superior, district or
county court and must satisfy the requirements of section 96 and
the other judicature sections of the B.N.A . Act. What this means
is that the tribunal will be invalidly constituted unless its mem-
bers (1) are appointed by the federal government in conformity
with section 96, (2) are drawn from the bar of the province in
conformity with sections 97 and 98, and (3) receive salaries which
are fixed and provided by the federal Parliament in conformity
with section 100.4
So far the law is clear, and the policy underlying it is com-
prehensible. But the courts have not succeeded in fashioning a
clear definition of those functions which ought properly to belong
to a superior, district or county court. Naturally, this has led to
considerable uncertainty as to the extent of provincial power to
establish and empower new inferior courts and administrative
tribunals.
II. Establishment of Administrative Tribunals.
Fortunately, the uncertainty as to the provincial power to establish
administrative tribunals was considerably relieved by the Privy
Council in Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East
Iron WorksLtd.5 In upholding the validity of the Labour Relations
The principal modern literature on the implications to be drawn
from ss 96-100 of the B .N.A . Act is J . Willis, Administrative Law and
the B.N.A. Act (1939), 53 Harv. L. Rev. 251, at pp. 261-271 ; Section
96 of the' B.N.A . Act (1940), 18 Can. Bar Rev. 517 ; M. C. Shumiatcher,
Section 96 of the B.N.A . Act Re-examined (1949), 27 Can. Bar Rev. 131 ;
B . Laskin, Municipal Tax Assessment and Section 96 of the B.N.A . Act
(1955), 33 Can. Bar Rev . 993 ; W . R . Lederman, The Independence of
the Judiciary (1956), 34 Can . Bar Rev. 769 and 1139, at pp.1158-1179 ;
B . Laskin, Comment (1963), 41 Can . Bar Rev. 446 ; G. Pépin, Les
tribunaux administratifs et la constitution (1969), Part I ; J . N . Lyon,
Comment (1971), 49 Can . Bar Rev. 365 ; G . E. LeDain, Sir Lyman Duff
and the Constitution (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J . 261, at pp. 325-336 .
5 [19491 A.C. 134.
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Board of Saskatchewan, the Privy Council settled that a province
could create an administrative tribunal to administer a new reg-
ulatory scheme, and could give to that tribunal the power to
adjudicate disputes including the power to make findings of
relevant law and fact. Although these functions, regarded by
themselves, were analogous to the functions of a superior, district
or county court, the analogy disappeared when the new tribunal's
powers were placed in the context of a new regulatory scheme,
such as the regime of collective bargaining . Since John East, the
provincial power to establish and empower administrative tribunals
has been relatively secure, and there is no reason to suppose that
section 96 difficulties have frustrated the development of admin-
istrative tribunals in the provinces ."
III . Protection of Administrative Tribunals from Judicial Review .
It is clear that even questions of law can be assigned to provincial
administrative tribunals, so long as they are part and parcel of a
jurisdiction which is not analogous to that of a superior, district
or county court . In John East, for example, it was obvious that
the labour board would often have to interpret the language of
its statute and decide other questions of law in the course of
adjudicating upon labour relations disputes ; and this was expressly
acknowledged by the Privy Council .'
What is not so clear is whether a province's legislative power
to assign questions of law to a provincial administrative tribunal
is based on the premise that the tribunal's decisions will be subject
to superior-court review . The decisions of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals have for centuries been subject to review
by superior courts through the prerogative writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus ; and in
more recent times by ordinary actions for a declaration or an
injunction, and even more recently in some jurisdictions by special
statutory remedies such as Ontario's new application for judicial
review . To the extent that superior-court review is available, the
's See, e .g ., Dupont v . Inglis, [1958] S.C.R. 535 (Mining Commissioner);
Brooks v . Pavlick, [1964] S.C.R. 108 (Master of Titles) ; Tremblay v .
Commission des Relations de Travail du Québec, [1967] S.C.R. 697
(Labour Relations Board) ; Tomko v . Labour Relations Board (N.S.),
Supreme Court of Canada, December 19th, 1975, not yet reported (Labour
Relations Board) . One area of continuing difficulty is municipal tax
assessment, where the courts have arguably not been faithful to the
John East test : Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (4th ed. rev., 1975),
pp . 784-788 ; Re Minister of Municipal Affairs (1972), 24 D.L.R . (3d)
534 .
7 Supra, footnote 5, at pp . 149-151 .
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establishment of a new inferior court or tribunal does not involve
a total exclusion of superior-court jurisdiction .
Professor J. N. Lyon has argued in the Canadian Bar Review$
that it is the availability of judicial review which protects from the
strictures of section 96 administrative tribunals with authority to
decide questions of law. The argument runs along these lines.
Questions of law may be assigned to a provincially-appointed
administrative tribunal, but only if the tribunal's decision is subject
to review by a superior court. If the tribunal's decision is not
subject to review by a superior court, then the tribunal will be
exercising a jurisdiction analogous to that of a superior , court and
its powers will be invalid.
The significance of Professor Lyon's view is that it would
accord constitutional protection to superior-court review, which
would mean that an attempt by a provincial legislature to abolish
the power of judicial review would be constitutionally bad as
offensive to section 96. In other words, administrative law, or at
least that branch of it which is concerned with judicial review of
administrative action, would be seen to rest on a constitutional
foundation, and not merely on a common law and statutory
foundation as is conventionally supposed .
It is common for a legislature, when establishing an admin-
istrative tribunal, to include in the constituent statute a "privative
clause", which is a provision purporting to exclude or restrict
judicial review of the tribunal's decisions. Privative clauses come
in a variety of fairly standard forms: the "finality clause" declares
that the decisions of the tribunal shall be "final" and not subject
to review ; the "exclusive jurisdiction" clause declares that the
tribunal's jurisdiction to decide issues before it is exclusive and
unreviewable ; the "no-certiorari clause" declares that certiorari
and other remedies which would otherwise be available for review
purposes are not available to review the tribunal's decisions; and
one could also include "notice clauses" and "limitation clauses"
which exclude review unless prior notice has been given or unless
proceedings are brought within a short time . The superior courts
have tended to give only limited effect to privative clauses. They
have reasoned that any given privative clause could not have been
intended to exclude judicial review in cases where the tribunal
has (in the court's opinion) exceeded its "jurisdiction", and they
have accordingly "interpreted" the privative clause as not pro-
tecting a tribunal decision which is vitiated by a "jurisdictional"
8 Op . cit., footnote 4.
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error.9 In most cases it is at least arguable that the legislature
did intend to protect the decisions of its tribunal, even when
vitiated by "jurisdictional" error. But the courts have consistently
undermined the apparent legislative intent by giving privative
clauses a narrow reading. Notice however that the courts' tech-
nique has been one of statutory interpretation . With one or two
exceptions,1° the courts have not placed their avoidance of priva-
tive clauses on any constitutional ground . If however judicial
review is constitutionally guaranteed, then of course privative
clauses in provincial statutes are simply unconstitutional, and the
results which the courts have reached as a matter of interpretation
were in fact compelled by the judicature provisions of the B.N.A.
Act.
By way of digression, it should be noticed that privative
clauses which purport to exclude a superior-court decision as to
the constitutionality of a statute are in a different category . They
have been held ineffective on constitutional grounds, not because
of section 96, but because the B.N.A . Act's distribution of powers
has been assumed to require implicitly that the courts police the
distribution to prevent usurpation by a legislative body of powers
which do not belong to it." For similar reasons, where an admin-
istrative tribunal is placed in the invidious position of having to
decide a constitutional issue, its decision must be subject to review
by a superior court notwithstanding any privative clause. A com-
mon case is where a provincial labour relations board has to
decide whether a particular industry is within federal or provincial
jurisdiction .' ;` Since a provincial legislature has no power to
regulate labour relations in an industry within federal jurisdiction,
9 For a brief review of the Canadian case law and literature, see
Hogg, The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949-1971
(1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L.J . 187, at pp . 196-204.
10 See infra, footnote 50.
"See Laskin, op . cit ., footnote 6, p. 96 ; Strayer, Judicial Review
of Legislation in Canada (1968), pp . 36-38; Thorson v. A.G . Can. (No. 2)
(1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1, at p. 11 . By parity of reasoning (although
the point is less clear where jurisdiction is being transferred from one
superior court to another and both are subject to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court of Canada), it may be doubted whether the federal
Parliament has the power to invest in the Federal Court of Canada the
exclusive jurisdiction to determine constitutional issues which would
formerly have been decided by the provincial superior courts : see infra,
footnote 41 .
12 This occurs frequently. Two recent examples which reached the
Supreme Court of Canada are Letter Carriers' Union of Canada v.
Canadian Union of Postal Workers (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 105 and
Canada Labour Relations Board v. C.N.R . Co . (1974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 1 .
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Judicial Review of Administrative Action 72 1
it cannot authorize a provincial tribunal to determine conclusively
whether or not a particular industry is within provincial or federal
jurisdiction ; otherwise, the tribunal by a wrong decision on the
classification of the industry could extend provincial power into
the forbidden federal area.13
Setting aside the special case where an administrative
tribunal's decision is constitutionally vulnerable, the claim that
judicial review of administrative action is generally guaranteed
by the constitution is a . very large claim indeed . In the United
States, where judicial review is widely revered, it might be expected
that either or both of the separation of powers doctrine or the
due process clause would have been held to afford a constitutional
guarantee of judicial review of administrative action . But, despite
occasional suggestions of such a doctrine, the Supreme Court of
the United States has not been prepared to accept it ; nor have
most state courts . It is reasonably clear that the federal Congress
and most state legislatures are free if they choose to enact priva-
tive clauses precluding judicial review of administrative action,
even on questions of law or jurisdiction, although probably not
on questions of constitutionality.} Considering that the B.N.A.
Act differs from the United States constitution in its lack of a
separation of powers doctrine, its lack of a bill of rights, and its
general adoption (admittedly with exceptions) of British notions
of parliamentary supremacy, it would be surprising to find that
judicial review of administrative action was constitutionally guar-
anteed in Canada but not in the United States .
13 This is known as the doctrine of "constitutional jurisdictional
facts" in Australia and the United States : Brett and Jiogg, Cases and
Materials on Administrative Law (2nd ed ., 1967), pp. 203-204 ; Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise (1958), ss 16.08, 29.08, 29.09. Curiously,
the doctrine does not find much support in Canadian cases, but it is
almost certainly the law : Strayer, op . cit ., footnote 11, at pp . 56-58 .
1} Privative clauses are not as common in the U.S.A . as they are in
Canada, and so the case-law is not as extensive as one might expect . For
full discussion, see Davis, op . cit ., !bid ., ss 28.18, 28.19, 29.08 ; Jaffe, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action (1965), pp . 353-357, 376-394 . For
discussion of the constitutionality of the sweeping privative clause in the
Veterans Administration statute, see R . L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial
Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits (1975), 27
Stanf. L. Rev . 905 . The assertion that judicial review is constitutionally
guaranteed, which was made by J . Willis in Administrative Law and the
B.N.A . Act, op . cit ., footnote 4, at p . 271, was probably justified by the
state of the authorities when he wrote, but is not correct in the light of
developments since then . The American case-law may be of direct relevance
to Canada now that the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Alberta Bill of
Rights include "due process" clauses .
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To say that a result is surprising is not to say that it is
impossible . We must therefore turn to the Canadian cases which
are relied upon by Professor Lyon for his constitutional guarantee
of judicial review . Is it plausible to explain the John East decision
as resting on the premise that the decisions of the Labour Rela-
tions Board of Saskatchewan would be subject to superior-court
review? There was in fact a privative clause in the John East case,
and it was argued "that a tribunal, whose decisions were not
subject to appeal and whose proceedings were not reviewable by
any Court of Law or by any certiorari or other proceedings
whatsoever, must be regarded as a Superior Court or a Court
analogous thereto".15 The Privy Council rejected the argument in
these words :-"'
But the same considerations which make it expedient to set up a
specialized tribunal may make it inexpedient that that tribunal's decisions
should be reviewed by an ordinary Court. It does not for that reason
become itself a "Superior" Court.
If this was all that their Lordships had said, it would have been
clear that the argument was without force . But they added two
more sentences: 17
Nor must its immunity from certiorari or other, proceedings be pressed
too far. It does not fall to their Lordships upon the present appeal
to determine the scope of that provision but it seems clear that it
would not avail the tribunal if it purported to exercise a jurisdiction
wider than that specifically entrusted to it by the Act.
It is possible that these two sentences could be read as qual-
ifying the earlier passage and stipulating that judicial review was
a constitutional necessity.18 But it seems much more likely that
their lordships were simply pointing out that the privative clause
would not in fact be interpreted as effective to exclude judicial
review for jurisdictional error. 19 This was a relevant point to make,
because it provided a second reason for rejecting the argument
based on the privative clause : since this privative clause would
not in fact be effective to exclude judicial review, an argument
based on the clause having effectively excluded judicial review
must fail . This is very different from the proposition that no
privative clause, however framed, could, as a matter of constitu-
tional law, exclude judicial review.
15Supra, footnote 5, at p. 151.
is Ibid ., at pp . 151-152.
17Ibid ., at p. 152 .
is Lyon, op . cit ., footnote 4, at pp . 367-368.
is Accord, H. W. Arthurs, The Dullest Bill : Reflections on the Labour
Code of British Columbia (1974), 9 U.B.C. L. Rev. 280, at p. 333 .
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That the availability of judicial review was not an essential
element of the John East decision is confirmed by other cases in
which the courts have considered rights of appeal to a superior
court from inferior courts or tribunals. If it is the availability of
judicial review which validates the conferral of adjudicatory
jurisdiction on administrative tribunals, then one would expect to
find that the availability of an appeal to a superior court would
tend to validate an assignment of section 96 functions to a provin-
cially-appointed court or tribunal .20 But this is not what has hap-
pened. In A.G . Ont. v. Victoria Medical Building Ltd., 21 the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down a provision of Ontario's
Mechanics' Lien Act which purported to confer upon a master
of the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to try mechanics' lien ac-
tions. The Act permitted any party to apply to the Supreme Court
for an order directing that the trial be held before a judge of the
Supreme Court. In cases where the trial was held before the
master there was a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from
the master's decision. The Supreme Court of Canada held that
the continuing presence of superior-court jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, did not validate the assignment of jurisdiction to
the master . There are many other cases where section 96 jurisdic-
tion has been unconstitutionally conferred upon a provincially-
appointed court or tribunal, and where there was a right of appeal
to the superior court. In such cases superior-court jurisdiction is
not totally excluded ; it is simply relegated to an appellate role .
But the existence of the right of appeal has never been held
sufficient to save, or even as tending to save, the otherwise invalid
assignment of section 96 jurisdiction to the provincially-appointed
court or tribunal . 22
If, as appears to be the case, a right of appeal to a superior
court will not validate an- assignment of section 96 jurisdiction to
20 This conclusion does not follow inevitably, since it is conceivable
that judicial review is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of con-
stitutional validity . But the tenor of the cases cited in the following two
notes give no support whatever for such a subtle position .
21 [1960] S.C.R. 32.
22 E.g ., C . Huebert Ltd v. Sharman, [1950] 2 D.L.R . 344 ; Schrier v .
Bernstein (1962), 33 D.L.R . (2d) 305 ; Re Judicature Amendment Act,
1970 (No . 4) (1971), 18 .D.L.R . (3d) 385; Re Minister of Municipal
Affairs (1972), 24 D.L.R . (3d) 534 (the irrelevance of a right of appeal
is explicit at pp. 542-543, per Bugold J.A.) ; Seminary of Chicoutimi v .
A .G. Que., [1973] S.C.R . 681 . In Dupont v. Inglis, [1958] S.C.R . 535
counsel turned the argument around and argued that the existence of a right
of appeal from the Mining Commissioner to a superior court showed that
the Commissioner must be exercising judicial power of a superior court
character . This argument was rejected : ibid., at p . 543 .
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an inferior court or tribunal, it seems most unlikely that it is the
existence of superior-court review (which is of course ordinarily
more limited than an appeal) which is what validates the assign-
ment of some adjudicatory functions to administrative tribunals.
The true position appears to be that the judicature provisions of
the B.N.A. Act prohibit the assignment of section 96 functions
to inferior courts or tribunals whether or not there is a right of
appeal to or review by a section 96 court. If this is so then the
rationale of John East is simply that the functions assigned to the
Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan were not section 96
functions. The presence or absence of judicial review was ir-
ielevant.
IV . Denial of Superior Court's Review Functions.
So far I have attempted to argue that the mere fact that a
tribunal's decisions are unreviewable by the courts does not make
that tribunal a superior, district or county court within section 96
of the B.N.A . Act. But a constitutional guarantee of judicial
review could still be supported on the basis of a slightly different
argument. It could be argued that because judicial review has
always been part of the functions of the superior courts, it is
unconstitutional to take the function away from them . This argu-
ment emphasizes not the conferral of conclusive powers on the
tribunal, but the taking away of review powers from the superior
courts . Professor W. R. Lederman, in his important article on
"The Independence of the Judiciary", has argued that it would
be contrary to the judicature sections of the B.N.A. Act to take
away a superior court's review functions.'23 There is, he says, an
"implied guarantee of jurisdiction" buried in the judicature sections
of the B.N.A. Act.=4 Assuming for the moment that this theory
is a possible one, what would be included in the superior courts'
implied guarantee of jurisdiction?
Professor Lyon takes the position that the constitutional
guarantee of superior-court jurisdiction encompasses the review
of all "questions of law" determined by administrative tribunals.
This position depends on the assumption that, in the absence of
a privative clause, a superior court always has power to review
questions of law decided by an administrative tribunal . But in fact
the superior courts in exercise of their review powers under the
prerogative writs never asserted so extensive a power. Only the
writ of certiorari allowed review of questions of law as such, and
23 Op . Cil., footnote 4, at p. 1174 .
24 Ibid ., at p. 1172 .
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then only if the error appeared on the face of the record . All of
the other supervisory remedies allowed review of questions of
law only if the question was one which marked out the limits of
the tribunal's jurisdiction. To be sure, the vagueness of the con-
cept of jurisdiction did sometimes lead an interventionist court to
review an error of law which did not really have a bearing on the
tribunal's jurisdiction,25 but it is quite clear that not all questions
of law have traditionally been reviewable . That being so, it is
impossible to maintain the proposition that review of all questions
of law is a constitutionally protected function of the superior
courts . In addition, there is a decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada which squarely denies the proposition. In Farrell v. Work-
men's Compensation Board,26 one of the rare cases in which a
privative clause has been held effective, the court rejected an
argument based on section 96 and held that a privative clause in
a Workmen's Compensation Act successfully precluded superior-
court review of questions of law as well as fact decided by the
Workmen's Compensation Board 27
Farrell still leaves room for an argument that section 96
prohibits a provincial legislature from taking away the superior
court's power to review jurisdictional questions decided by admin
istrative tribunals.28 In this restricted form, Professor Lyon's
argument would be more persuasive . It is this position which is
urged by Professor Lederman: "The provinces cannot deny to the
superior courts power to review and determine finally the scope
of statutory and common law powers conferred on provincial
government officials or on provincial minor courts or non-curial
tribunals."29 Whether this proposition is correct or not has never
25 See Hogg, The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court
of Canada (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall L.J . 203 .
26 [1962] S.C.R . 48 .
27 Professor Lyon seeks to distinguish this case on the basis that the
Workmen's Compensation Board did not have to decide any legal question
anyway, because its statute said that it was to decide "upon the real
merits and justice of the case" and was not bound to follow "strict legal
precedent'.' . The Supreme Court however explicity assumed that the Board
would be deciding questions,of law and held that the privative clause was
effective to protect such decision : ibid ., at p . 51 . Moreover, Professor
Lyon's explanation involves acknowledging that a . "real merits and
justice" clause (which is really little more than a kind of "exclusive
jurisdiction" clause) is an effective privative clause, which if true makes
the avoidance of s . 96's alleged protection of judicial review simply a
matter of legislative drafting .
2s See Laskin, op . cit., footnote 6, p . 766 .
29 Op . C it., footnote 4, at p . 1174 . For cautious support, see G . E .
LeDain, op . cit., footnote 4, at pp . 334-336 .
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had to be decided because of the courts' steadfast refusal to
interpret privative clauses as purporting to exclude judicial review
for jurisdictional error.3° When a legislative draftsman is bold
enough and clever enough to produce such a clause,"' or when
the courts alter their interpretations of the existing standard clauses,
then the courts will have to face the issue.
When the issue does have to be decided I believe the courts
should and will uphold the privative clause . In the first place, it
is doubtful whether the language of section 96 will support the
inference of a guaranteed superior-court jurisdiction . After all,
section 96 simply provides for the appointment of superior, dis-
trict and county court judges . One can understand why the courts
have insisted that when a new jurisdiction is conferred upon an
inferior court or tribunal the new jurisdiction must not be a
judicial function analogous to that of a superior, district or county
court.32 This insistence has pushed section 96 a long way beyond
a simple provision for appointment of judges by the federal gov-
ernment. But if we can accept that section 96 implicitly limits the
kinds of functions which may be conferred upon inferior courts
and tribunals, it is hard to take the further step and read section
96 as also limiting the kings of functions which may be taken
away from the superior, district or county courts . Professor Leder-
man argues that the "implied guarantee of jurisdiction" may be
inferred not from section 96 alone, but "from the cumulative
effect of all the judicature sections of the B.N.A . Act".u But it
is not easy to see how the inference is much strengthened by the
addition of the other judicature sections of the B.N.A. Act, namely,
sections 97 to 101, dealing with legal qualifications, tenure and
payment of judges, and with the creation of federal courts.
The inference of an implied guarantee of jurisdiction in the
judicature sections of the B.N.A. Act is especially difficult to
accept when one considers that the B.N.A. Act does not guarantee
other civil libertarian values .34 The absence of a bill of rights in the
30 See text accompanying footnote 9, supra.
ai The Labour Code of British Columbia, S.B .C ., 1973, c. 122, s. 33,
as am ., 1975, c. 33, includes a clause which purports to confer on the
Labour Relations Board the power "to determine the extent of its juris
diction" and "to determine any fact or question of law that is necessary
to establish its jurisdiction" . The constitutionality of this clause has been
admirably analyzed by H. W. Arthurs, op . cit., footnote 19, at
pp . 335-337 .
32 See text accompanying footnote 4, supra.
330p . cit., footnote 4, at p. 1172 .
34 This anomaly is emphasized by Arthurs, op . cit., footnote 19,
at p. 331 .
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B.N.A . Act reflected a preference on the part of the Canadian
framers for British rather than American constitutional ideas. As
the preamble to the B.N.A. Act declares, Canada was to have "a
constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom".
One consequence of this premise was that the powers of the Legis-
latures were to be "as plenary and as ample within the limits
prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plen-
itude of its power possessed and could bestow" .35 Needless to say,
the B.N.A. Act could and did impose limits on the powers of the
provincial legislatures, but new limits should not be inferred from
language which is at best equivocal.3" One limit which is estab-
lished by the cases is that the judicature sections of the B.N.A .
Act prohibit the conferral of review powers on a provincially-
appointed court or tribunal ;37 but I submit that the existing doc-
trine should not be extended so as also to prohibit the taking
away of a superior court's review powers .
In Pringle v. Fraser,3s the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the federal Parliament, in exercise of its power over immi-
gration, could establish an Immigration Appeal Board to review
deportation orders, and could preclude review by the provincial
superior courts of the decisions of the Board even on jurisdictional
questions. Laskin J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of
the whole (nine-judge) court, said that "certiorari, as a remedial
proceeding, has no necessary ongoing life in relation to all matters
for which it could be used, if competent excluding legislation is
enacted" .3s In A.G . Can. v. Canard,4° Beetz J. held that the
Federal Court Act, which by sections 18 and 28 purports to con-
fer upon the Federal Court of Canada the exclusive power to
review the decisions of a "federal board, commission or other
tribunal", did effectively deny to the provincial superior courts
the power to review the decisions taken by a Minister under the
authority of the Indian Act. It is reasonably clear, therefore, that,
at least where no constitutional (distribution of powers) question
35Hodge v . The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas . 117, at p . 132 .
3s The same criticism is, in my view, applicable to the occasional
suggestions that there is an "implied bill of rights" in the B.N.A . Act .
Only one judge of the Supreme Court of Canada has ever unequivocally
espoused such a notion, namely, Abbott J . in Switzman v . Elbling, [1957]
S.C.R . 285, at p . 328; for all the references, see Laskin, op . cit ., footnote
6, at pp . 900.20-900.25 .
37 Seminary of Chicoutimi v . A.G . Que., supra, footnote 22 .
38 [19721 S.C.R. 821 .
39 Ibid ., at pp . 826-827 .
40 (1975), 52 D.L.R . (3d) 548, at p . 583 .
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is involved,} 1 the federal Parliament can take away the review
powers of the provincial superior courts .''
Now it may be objected that Pringle v. Fraser and A.G. Can.
v. Canard were concerned with the federal Parliament, and that
the judicature sections of the B.N.A. Act impose a restraint only
upon the provincial legislatures . But while it is widely accepted
that the judicature sections (other than section 101) apply only
to courts created by the provincial legislatures,43 surely the theory
of a constitutionally-guaranteed core of provincial superior-court
jurisdiction requires that the guaranteed core of jurisdiction be
invulnerable to federal as well as provincial legislative attack .
Since superior-court review powers may be taken away by the
federal Parliament, it follows that the alleged core of jurisdiction
is either protected by a remarkably inadequate guarantee or it is
not guaranteed at all.
There are two recent cases which suggest that the latter
alternative is correct, that is to say, that the provincial legislatures
as well as the federal Parliament may take away the review
powers of the provincial superior courts . The first case, Farrell v.
Worknien's Compensation Board,4} has already been mentioned.
In that case the court was dealing with a standard privative clause
and accordingly only decided that review of errors of law and
fact within jurisdiction could be excluded ; but the section 96
argument to the contrary was dismissed by the Supreme Court of
Canada so peremptorily and absolutely as to suggest that the
41 Neither Pringle v. Fraser, supra, footnote 38, nor A.G Can. v.
Canard, ibid., had to decide whether the federal Parliament could with-
draw the power of a provincial superior court to determine a constitutional
question . The language of s. 101 of the B.N.A . Act, referring to "the
better administration of the laws of Canada", does not suggest the existence
of any such power; and the privative clause cases suggest the absence of
any such power: supra, footnote 11 . Denison Mines Ltd v. A.G. Can.,
[1973] 1 O.R . 797, 32 D.L.R . (3d) 419 (Ont. H.C.) may be wrongly
decided on this point : Dale Gibson, Comment (1976), 54 Can. Bar
Rev. 372.
42It is worth noting too, in case it should be thought to be relevant,
that neither the Immigration Appeal Board nor the Federal Court satisfies
the stipulations of the judicature sections of the B.N.A . Act, because
in each case the members or judges retire at age 70, which is inconsistent
with s. 99's guarantee of tenure until age 75 .
}3 Laskin, op. cit., footnote 6, at p. 762; A .G . Can. v. Canard, supra,
footnote 40, at p. 551, per Laskin C.J ., but compare the more guarded
statements by Beetz J., at pp . 572, 573, 578. Lederman takes the view
that the judicature sections apply to the federal courts as well : op . cit .,
footnote 4, at p. 1176 .
44 Supra, footnote 26 and accompanying text .
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argument would be unavailable even with respect to a more
sweeping clause. 45
The second case is even more suggestive. In Woodward
Estate v. Minister of Finance,4E a privative clause in British
Columbia's Succession Duty Act was in issue. The Act exempted
from succession duty property bequeathed to charitable organiza-
tions, and it empowered the provincial Minister of Finance. to
determine whether or not an organization was charitable. The
Minister made a determination that the Woodward Foundation
was not charitable, but the determination was made in breach of
natural justice. After the Minister had made his determination, the
British Columbia Legislature amended the Succession Duty Act
by adding a privative clause in the following terms :47
. . . the determination of the Minister is final, conclusive, and binding
on all persons and . . . is not open to appeal, question, or review in
any court, and any determination of the Minister made under this
subsection is hereby ratified and confirmed and is binding on all
persons .
This amendment was expressly made retrospective so that it
applied to the Minister's Woodward determination. The Supreme
Court of Canada assumed that a standard privative clause would
be ineffective to preclude review of a determination made in
breach of natural justice (this being equivalent to a jurisdictional
error) . The clause in this case was a standard one, except for the
last phrase declaring that any determination "is hereby ratified
and confirmed" . "Without these words", the court said, "the
Minister's determination would have been without legal force or
effect, but it cannot be treated as though it had never existed" ;
the effect of the ratifying and confirming words was to "breathe
life into" the otherwise invalid determination; it followed that the
decision, having "received statutory confirmation", could not be
reviewed by the court.48
The Woodward case is exceptionally interesting in that
superior-court review on jurisdictional grounds was successfully
precluded by the legislature. However, because the privative
enactment was retrospective in its application to the Woodward
determination, the case is not a direct authority on the efficacy of
45 The dictum rejecting the s. 96 argument was approved again by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Brooks v. Pavlick, supra, footnote 6,
at p . 118 .
4s[1973] S.C.R . 120.
47 S.B.C., 1970, c . 45, s . 5(2) .
4s Supra, footnote 46, at p . 129 .
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prospective preclusion of judicial review on jurisdictional grounds.
Nevertheless, it was argued in the case that the sweeping privative
clause offended sections 96 to 100 of the B.N.A . Act by giving
the Minister powers analogous to those of a superior, district or
county court judge. This argument was rejected by the Supreme
Court of Canada.49 They drew no distinction between this clause
and a prospective clause, and indeed they rejected the argument
so summarily (without calling for argument in reply) as to suggest
that it would not be available with respect to a prospective clause
either.50
It is occasionally argued that there are good policy reasons
for excluding the superior courts from some areas of regulatory
law, for example, labour law, where their intervention has not
been beneficial.51 For my part, I do not believe that it would ever
be wise for a legislature to exclude judicial review of agency
decisions altogether .52 But one must not confuse what is unwise
with what is unconstitutional, and in my view section 96 is too
frail a foundation to support the building of a constitutionally-
guaranteed administrative law.53
49Ibid ., at p . 126.
50 In support of the Lederman-Lyon position, there is the equivocal
dictum in the John East case which was discussed earlier (see text ac-
companying footnotes 15-19, supra) and a few other dicta cited in Laskin,
op. cit ., footnote 6, pp . 764-766 ; for comment, see Laskin, Comment
(1963), 41 Can . Bar Rev. 446 ; Arthurs, op. cit., footnote 19, at p. 330 .
51 See P . C . Weiler, The Slippery Slope of Judicial Intervention (1971),
9 Osgoode Hall L.J . 1 .
52 See P . W. Hogg, Judicial Review : How Much Do We Need? (1974),
20 McGill L.J . 157 .
531 am grateful to my colleagues, Professors Bill Angus, John Evans
and Garry Watson, each of whom read a draft version of this paper and
made suggestions for its improvement .
